
The kindest take on the recently concluded US-China summit in Beijing was that the relationship has ‘improved’ from antagonism to direct engagement. That the meeting ended without acrimony was the achievement.
The US has clearly recalibrated its approach towards China, as confronting it has not helped. Reasons are likely a mix of a realisation that the Chinese have become too strong to intimidate, and that culturally they do not respond well to threats. China played the good host, and President Xi signalled a conflict was not unavoidable, saying “achieving the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation and making America great again can go hand in hand.”
They allowed Secretary of State Marco Rubio, who had been sanctioned in 2020 for his remarks against China, appropriate access to events and President Xi, by changing the Chinese name of his spelling.
But economic and geopolitical observers globally, who had their radars up to catch signals of either side shifting stances on a host of major issues, were left counting the number of hours the two leaders spent together, shifts in body language, the sites visited, the food served and the music played.
For the rest of the world, and India, it is important that the two largest powers in the world today do not exchange blows, but also that they do not get too close in an explicit G2 formulation, dividing the world into geographical and sectoral spheres of dominance.
After an escalation in the trade war and the military action in Venezuela, Cuba, and Iran - all moves in the Grand War between the US and China - perhaps an ‘expensive sight-seeing tour of Beijing’ as some have called it, was necessary.
But one cannot but lament the complete lack of progress on major issues plaguing the global economy. Chinese mercantilism continues to do more damage to global trade than Trump tariffs: goods exports grew 14% year-on-year in April, with auto exports up 74%. 9 million cars exported in the last 12 months mean one-in-six cars sold outside China was Chinese. In March and April this shifted towards one-in-five, and one-in-four if one excludes the US, where a tariff wall effectively blocks Chinese cars.
Despite promises to boost domestic consumption (which in our view is not easy), and pronouncements against ‘involution’ (excessive competition that is wiping out industrial profits in China), investments in industrial capacity continue. While most commentators - including, sadly, many in the US government - focus on the nominal dollar-renminbi exchange-rate, given very low inflation in China, the real-effective-exchange-rate (REER), the true measure of a currency’s impact on trade competitiveness, continues to fall. It is down by nearly a fifth in three years.
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